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WORKMEN'S COMPN NSATION: COMPENSABILITY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
DISABILITY PRECIPITATED BY PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d
603,369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975)
Claimant, respondents' employee, became mentally disabled after
discovering the body of her immediate supervisor who had shot himself
to death.1 The Workmen's Compensation Board affirmed a referee's
decision awarding benefits, 2 but the Supreme Court of New York, Ap-
pellate Division, reversed, holding that "mental injury solely from men-
tal cause is not compensable."3 The Court of Appeals of New York
reversed and held: A psychological trauma arising out of and in the
course of employment that causes psychological disability is an injury
within the meaning of New York Workmen's Compensation Law.4
1. Claimant's immediate supervisor was before his suicide security director for
respondent department store. His job placed great pressures upon him, especially during
holiday seasons, which resulted in his becoming upset. This condition usually disap-
peared at the close of the holiday season. After the 1970 Christmas holiday, however,
he remained nervous and agitated. As his condition deteriorated in the early part of
1971, he confided in claimant, expressing doubts about his ability to handle his job.
Claimant assumed added responsibilities in an effort to ease her supervisor's burdens,
and attempted to improve his morale.
On June 9, 1971, claimant received an inter-office call from her supervisor asking her
to summon the police which she did. After attempting unsuccessfully to call back her
supervisor, she went to his office where she found him "lying in a pool of blood caused
by a self-inflicted gunshot wound in the head." Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.,
36 N.Y.2d 505, 507, 330 N.E.2d 603, 604, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 639 (1975).
Claimant's guilt about her failure to prevent the suicide developed into a condition
diagnosed as an acute depressive reaction. She was hospitalized twice during 1971,
receiving electroshock therapy and medication. She was unable to return to work until
January 1972. Id. at 507-08, 330 N.E.2d at 604, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39.
2. Id. at 508, 330 N.E.2d at 605i 369 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
3. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curt Co., 44 App. Div. 2d 739, 739, 354 N.Y.S.2d
470, 471 (1974).
4. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603,
606, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975). The majority opinion in Wolfe used six phrases
interchangeably and without definition: "mental injury," "psychic trauma," "psychologi-
cal injury," "nervous or psychological disorders," "psychic injury," "psychological or
nervous injury." To avoid ambiguity, "trauma" or "impact" will be used to designate
an occurrence (cause) that gives rise to a subsequent disability (effect). "Psychological"
or "mental" will be used in contradistinction to "physical," although this distinction is
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Workmen's compensation laws were first enacted after the turn of the
century in response to an increase in industrial accidents and to the in-
adequacy of the tort remedies provided to injured employees by the
common law. These laws were intended to reimburse workers
for a portion of their lost wages and medical expenses, provide
rehabilitation for injured workers, and encourage employers to mini-
mize occupational injury.6 To implement these objectives workmen's
not as absolute as is often assumed. Thus, in Wolfe, claimant suffered a psychological
trauma when she discovered the body of her supervisor. This resulted in (caused)
a psychological disability (acute depressive reaction). If claimant had, for example, suf-
fered a heart attack after finding the body or strained her back in an attempt to move
it, her disability would be said to be "physical." For a discussion of the language prob-
lems in this area, see Render, Mental Illness As An Industrial Accident, 31 TENN. L.
Rmv. 288 (1964).
5. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.20 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as LARSON]. The common law defenses available to employers sued for
injuries by employees included the fellow-servant exception to respondeat superior liabil-
ity, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. Id. § 4.30. Professor Schneider
estimates that under the common law system between 70 and 80 percent of dis-
abilities caused by industrial or work accidents went uncompensated. 1 W.
SCHNEIDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TExT § 1 & n.4 (perm. ed. 1941) [hereinafter
cited as ScHNmE TErxT]. On the history of workmen's compensation laws, see 1
SCHMNEER, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1-3 (2d ed. 1932) [herein-
after cited as ScHNEmER]; SCHNEEDER TEXT § 9-10; 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation
* 5 (1958); NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPEN-
DIum ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 11-19 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL
CoMM-N CoMPENDIUM]; WAGE AND LI.OR STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
BULL. No. 161, STATE WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAws 1-2 (rev. ed. 1969). For a
list of "Selected Legal Periodical Articles, Comments and Notes," see E. BLAire, REF-
ERENCE GUmE TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1:00 (1968).
6. Comment, Workmen's Compensation Awards for Psychoneurotic Reactions, 70
YALE L.J. 1129, 1130 (1961).
The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws' Report listed
five basic objectives of a modem workmen's compensation program:
(I) Workmen's Compensation Should Provide Broad Coverage of Employees
and Work-Related Injuries and Diseases
(2) Workmen's Compensation Should Provide Substantial Protection Against
Interruption of Income
(3) Workmen's Compensation Should Provide Sufficient Medical Care and
Rehabilitation Services
(4) Workmen's Compensation Should Encourage Safety
(5) There Should Be an Effective Delivery System for Workmen's Compensa-
tion
NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT 35-39 (1972).
See also 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 5 (1958); 1 LARSON § 2.20; 1 SCumERin
1 1; 1 ScHN ER TEXT §§ 1-10; Larson, Basic Concepts & Objectives of Workmen's
Compensation, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON STATE
WORKMN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 31-38 (1973); NATIONAL COMM'N COmPENDIUM 21-
26.
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compensation laws require employers, regardless of fault,7 to compen-
sate employees for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment."" Most states, however, impose the limitation that the injury
be accidental."
Cases involving psychological trauma, psychological disability, or
both present difficulties10 in defining the scope of the term accidental
7. See e.g., Colvert v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 409, -, 520 P.2d 322,
324 (1974); Ross v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Ed., 21 Cal. App. 3d 949, 957, 99
Cal. Rptr. 79, 84 (1971); Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, -, 510
P.2d 891, 893 (1973); Thomas v. Certified Refrigeration, Inc., 392 Mich. 623, 637
n.6, 221 N.W.2d 378, 385 n.6 (1974); Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973); White v. Atlantic City Press, 64 NJ. 128, 137, 313 A.2d 197, 202
(1973); Buhler v. Gossner, - Utah 2d -, -, 530 P.2d 803, 805 (1975); Montoya v.
Greenway Aluminum Co., 10 Wash. App. 630, 633-34, 519 P.2d 22, 27 (1974).
8. N.Y. WOMEN'S Comp. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965). This language is used
by nearly every state. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Vernon Supp. 1975);
N.J. SrAT. ANN. § 34:15-7 (1959). The phrase "arising out of . . . employment"
refers to the causal relationship that must exist between injury and employment, while
"in the course of employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the injury occurred. Illinois Country Club, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 387 111. 484,
488, 56 N.E.2d 786, 788 (1944); A.C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Barnhill, 249 Ky.
437, 442, 61 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1933); Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561,
565, 48 A.2d 166, 167-68 (1945); Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich. 8, 12, 296 N.W.2d
861, 862 (1941); Appleby v. Great Western Sugar Co., 176 Neb. 102, 106, 125 N.W.2d
103, 106 (1963); Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 NJ. Super. 60, 69, 71, 139 A.2d
126, 131, 133 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958); Berry v. Colonial Furniture Co., 232 N.C.
303, 306, 60 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1950); Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Davis, 173 Okla. 190,
192, 47 P.2d 163, 164 (1935); Knox v. Batson, 217 Tenn. 620, 630, 399 S.W.2d 765,
770 (1966). For a discussion of the difficulties in applying this statutory language
in cases in which psychological trauma or psychological disabilities are present, see
Render, supra note 4. Render stated:
The fact of the mental illness cases which makes the test difficult to apply
is that rarely does a mental illness result from a single cause. More often
than not it results from many causes, including basic defects in the employee's
personality structure, and hence, it is arguable that mental illness is an ail-
ment common to all mankind irrespective of the employer-employee relation-
ship.
Id. at 297. See also Horovitz, The Litigious Phrase: "Arising out of' Employment (pts.
1-2), 3 NACCA L.. 15, 4 Id. 19 (1949).
9. Only seven states do not require an "accidental" injury. See CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 3600 (Deering 1964); Almquist v. Shenandoah Nurseries, Inc., 218 Iowa 724, 254
N.W. 35 (1934); Crowley's Case, 287 Mass. 367, 191 N.E. 668 (1934); Mottonen
v. Calumet & Hecla, Inc., 360 Mich. 659, 105 N.W.2d 33 (1960); Gillette v. Harold,
Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960); Bishop v. Chauvin Spinning Co., 86
R.I. 435, 136 A.2d 616 (1957); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958).
10. Significant problems arise in these cases because of the traditional view that
mental illnesses are unreal or imaginary. As a consequence of this view, many courts
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injury" and in proving a causal relationship between the work-related
attempt to prevent fraudulent claims by requiring a "physical" element as a basis for
recovery.
The impact of this pervasive preconception on compensation decisions can
be briefly stated. A high proportion of the cases display a search for some-
thing-anything-that can be called "physical" to supply the element of "real-
ity" in the injury.
Larson, Mental and Nervous Injury in Workmen's Compensation, 23 VAND. L. REv.
1243, 1243 (1970). The possibility of fraudulent claims is especially acute when a
psychological trauma results in psychological disability.
It is recognized that the difficulty of eliciting proof to establish causation may
be the reason for denial of awards in "purely mental" cases. The persistent
prerequisite that a physical factor be present on which to base an award is
evidence that the courts indulge in this discrimination among labels to prevent
recovery by malingerers. It is submitted, however, that mental illness and
malingering are often equated in the minds of some, including judges.
Note, Compensability of Mental Illness Under the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Law, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 390, 391 (1960) (emphasis original). See Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 999 (1958) (mental
injury capable of clear medical proof). But see Millar v. Town of Newburgh, 43 App.
Div. 2d 641, 642, 249 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1973) (medical science cannot adequately
distinguish between meritorious and fraudulent claims).
11. See, e.g., Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968);
Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
In Brady, claimant became emotionally upset following a discussion with her employer
about whether an absence was to be charged against her. Claimant's arm became para-
lyzed as a result of a conversion reaction. Doctors testified that there was no physical
reason for the paralysis. The court held that she did not suffer an "injury" resulting
from an "accident" as required by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
While the result may not have been intended or expected, the occurrence
out of which her condition arose ...was in no way accidental. She was
called in to the office for the discussion; the discussion proceeded between
her and her superior in an apparently normal manner; and until that had ended
nothing untoward happened.
117 Ga. App. at 314, 160 S.E.2d at 425.
In Bekelski, plaintiff, an elevator operator for defendant, was operating an elevator
when a passenger was caught between the floor of the elevator and the second floor
of the building. Plaintiff, who spent thirty minutes in the elevator with the dying
passenger before help arrived, contended that the sight of the accident and her proximity
to it caused injury to her nervous system, entitling her to compensation. Plaintiff was
not physically injured, but the court found her to be totally disabled within the meaning
of the workmen's compensation law. The court, however, denied her claim:
Our statute defines an accident as follows: "The word 'accident' ...shall
. ..be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening sud-
denly and violently ...and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury. The term 'injury' and 'personal injuries' shall mean only violence to
the physical structure of the body..."
141 Neb. at 658, 4 N.W.2d at 742-43, quoting Law of April 21, 1913, ch. 198, § 52(b),
[19131 Neb. Laws 601. The court stated that although there was clearly an "unexpected
or unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently," there was no "violence to the
physical structure of the body" since no physical injury was shown. Id. at 659, 661,
4 N.W.2d at 743-44.
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trauma and the resulting disability.' 2 Courts have almost uniformly
held that psychological disabilities resulting from physical impacts fall
within the meaning of accidental injury and are therefore compensa-
ble.'5 Similarly, most decisions have awarded compensation for physi-
cal disabilities resulting from psychological trauma. 14 Courts remain
troubled, however, by the situation in which there is no physical ele-
ment. 15 Nonetheless, an increasing number of jurisdictions have
awarded compensation in this third situation. 6
In Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955), however,
the court held that a disabling neurosis (anxiety reaction) caused solely by psychologi-
cal trauma was an injury within the meaning of Texas' workmen's compensation law.
The statute defined "injury" or "personal injury" as "damage or harm to the physical
structure of the body." Id. at 435, 279 S.W.2d at 318. The court stated:
The phrase "physical structure of the body" . . . must refer to the entire
body, not simply to the skeletal structure or to the circulatory system or to
the digestive system. It refers to the whole, to the complex of perfectly inte-
grated and interdependent bones, tissues and organs which function together
by means of electrical, chemical and mechanical processes in a living, breath-
ing fuctioning [sic] individual.
The substance of all the testimony shows agreement that plaintiff's body
no longer functions properly. Now, can we say that, as a matter of law,
even though a "physical structure" no longer functions properly, it has suffered
no "harm"? What meaning can the word "harm" to the body have if not
that, as a result of the event or condition in question, the body has ceased
to function properly?
Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318-19 (emphasis original).
12. The problem of causation is further complicated by the fact that mental disturb-
ances can be more easily simulated than physical ailments. See Hanna, Neurosis in
Workmen's Compensation Cases, 11 DEFENsB L.J. 189, 192-93 (1962). See note 10
supra.
13. IA LARSON § 42.22 at 7-359 n.68. See, e.g., Brown v. Northwest Airlines Inc.,
444 P.2d 529 (Alas. 1968); Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 424, 498
P.2d 498 (1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Farley, - Del. -, 290 A.2d 639 (1972);
Spetyla v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ill. 2d 1, 319 N.E.2d 40 (1974); Deines v. Greer,
216 Kan. 548, 532 P.2d 1257 (1975); Ricky Coal Co. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 464 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1968); Harrell v. Delta Drilling Co., 251 So. 2d 97 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
Boatwright v. ACF Indus., Inc., 463 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Webb v. Hamil-
ton, 78 N.M. 647, 436 P.2d 507 (1968); Trgo v. Harris Structural Steel Corp., 13
App. Div. 2d 856, 214 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1961).
14. 1A LARSON § 42.21. See, e.g., Sturgill v. M & M, Inc., 329 A.2d 360 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1974); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); Klein v. Len H.
Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922); Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply
Co., 128 N.J.L. 443, 25 A.2d 894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean
Airway, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N:E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961); Kinney v.
State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 245 Or. 543, 423 P.2d 186 (1967). Contra, Liscio
v. S. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483, 24 A.2d 136 (1942).
15. IA LARSON § 42.23.
16. See Butler v. District Parking Mgmt. Co., 363 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (statu-
tory presumption of coverage); American Nat'l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559 (7thWashington University Open Scholarship
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New York Workmen's Compensation Law requires employers to
provide compensation "for disability or death from injury arising out of
and in the course of employment. . .. -17 The statute defines injury
as "accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment,"' 8
but fails to define accidental injury. 9 New York awards compensation
Cir. 1964) (same); Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207
(1971); McMillan v. Western Pac. R.R., 54 Cal. 2d 841, 357 P.2d 449, 9 Cal. Rptr.
361 (1960); Baker v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 279 (1961); Royal State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Appeal Bd.,
53 Hawaii 32, 487 P.2d 278 (1971) (statutory presumption of coverage); Carter v.
General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960); Todd v. Goostree,
493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, Inc., 25 NJ.
Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446 (Hudson County Ct. Law Div.), aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598,
98 A.2d 604 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953); Kinney v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n,
245 Or. 543, 423 P.2d 186 (1967); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 143 Tex.
430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204,
13 S.E.2d 291 (1941); School Dist. No. 1 v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human
Relations, 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974); Yates v. South Kirkby, & C. Col-
lieries [1910], 2 K.B. 538 (C.A.). Contra, Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App.
23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972), distinguishing Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, supra; City Ice
& Fuel Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952); Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117
Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968); Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196
Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986 (1966); Hackett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 758 (La.
Ct. App.), review denied, 250 La. 634, 197 So. 2d 652 (1967); Bekelski v. O.F. Neal
Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942); Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc.
791, 187 A. 334 (Dep't of Labor 1936).
17. N.Y. WORKMEN'S Co tP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965):
Every employer subject to this chapter shall .. . secure compensation to his
employees and pay or provide compensation for their disability or death from
injury arising out of and in the course of the employment without regard to
fault as a cause of the injury, except that there shall be no liability for compen-
sation under this chapter when the injury has been solely occasioned by intoxi-
cation of the injured employee while on duty or by wilful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another.
18. N.Y. WoRKmEN's Coup. LAw § 2-7 (McKinney 1965):
"Injury" and "personal injury" mean only accidental injuries arising out of
and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may nat-
urally and unavoidably result therefrom.
19. New York courts have defined the term. See Woodruff v. Howes Constr. Co.,
228 N.Y. 276, 278, 127 N.E. 270, 270-71 (1920) ("takes place without one's foresight
or expectation;" "not expected"); Deyo v. Village of Piermont, Inc., 283 App. Div.
67, 69, 126 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525 (1953) ("suddenness"); Broderick v. Liebmann Brew-
cries, 277 App. Div. 422, 424, 100 N.Y.S.2d 837, 839 (1950) ("something extraordinary
or catastrophic"). In Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56
(1950), the court stated:
Whether a particular event was an industrial accident is to be determined,
not by any legal definition, but by the common-sense viewpoint of the average
man.
Id. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57.
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benefits when physical impact produces psychological disability2 and
when psychological trauma produces physical disability.2 ' In Chernin v.
Progress Service Co.,2 2 the appellate division refused to award compen-
sation to a driver who developed a psychological disability after striking
a pedestrian with his taxicab, holding that psychological disability caused
by psychological trauma is noncompensable.23  The court of appeals af-
firmed the decision on other grounds,24 but expressly reserved the
question whether "an occurrence arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment which causes psychological trauma may. . . be compensable
even though there was no physical injury." 2  Subsequently, in Straws
v. Fail,26 the appellate division denied compensation to a porter who
became psychologically disabled after a co-employee died in his arms.
The appellate division relied on its own holding in Chernin, disregard-
ing the reservation of the court of appeals.2 7  The court of appeals de-
nied claimant's motion for leave to appeal, 28 leaving the question unset-
fled.
20. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Shaffrey, 308 N.Y. 729, 124 N.E.2d 339 (1954); Kalikoff
v. John Lucas & Co., 297 N.Y. 663, 76 N.E.2d 324, aff'g 271 App. Div. 942, 67
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1947); Pokorny v. Chadbourne Wallace, Parkes & Whiteside, 14 App.
Div. 2d 662, 219 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1961); Trgo v. Harris Structural Steel Corp., 13 App.
Div. 2d 856, 214 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1961). For a list of decisions in other jurisdictions
awarding benefits, see note 13 supra.
21. See, e.g., Snyder v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights, 31 N.Y.2d
284, 290 N.E.2d 821, 338 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1972); Eckhaus v. Adeck Stores, Inc., 11
N.Y.2d 862, 182 N.E.2d 287, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1962); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean
Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961); Masse v.
James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950); Pickerell v. Schumacher,
242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1929); Weinstein v. Apex Dress Co., 31 App. Div. 2d
590, 295 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1968); Antonini v. Progressive Electronics, 15 App. Div. 2d 842,
224 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1962); Schwartz v. Hampton House Mgmt. Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d
936, 221 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1961); Pukaluk v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 7 App. Div. 2d
676, 179 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1958). Contra, Millar v. Town of Newburgh, 43 App. Div.
2d 641, 349 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1973). For a list of decisions in other jurisdictions, see note
14 supra.
22. 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959).
23. Id. at 172, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
24. The court of appeals memorandum stated that "the facts in this case do not war-
rant the finding that claimant suffered an accidental injury . . .within the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Law." Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 880,
881, 175 N.E.2d 827, 827-28, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (1961).
25. Id. at 881, 175 N.E.2d at 828, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
26. 17 App. Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1962).
27. Id. at 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 894. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
28. 12 N.Y.2d 647 (1963).
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In Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.2" the court of appeals began
its analysis by recognizing that workmen's compensation laws, as social
legislation designed "to shift the risk of loss . . from the worker to
industry and ultimately [to] the consumer," 30 should be construed
liberally in favor of the employee.3' After examining the New York
cases,32 the court announced that "psychological or nervous injury pre-
cipitated by psychic trauma is compensable to the same extent as
physical injury. '33 The court emphasized two factors in reaching its po-
sition. First, an individual's physical and psychological makeup deter-
mines whether the disability will be physical or mental.34 The court rea-
soned that recovery in a particular case should not depend upon
whether an individual was more susceptible to mental than physical in-
jury.35 Second, the court believed that since it had recognized both "the
reliability of identifying psychic trauma as a causative factor of injury"'36
and "the reliability [of] identifying psychological injury as a resultant
29. 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975).
30. Id. at 509, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
31. Id. One commentator has suggested that although workmen's compensation
laws "should be and are interpreted liberally ...legislative intentions should not be
disregarded in the name of liberal construction." E. BLAIR, supra note 5 at § 1:00.
32. The court specifically took note of Snyder v. New York State Comm'n For Hu-
man Rights, 31 N.Y.2d 284, 290 N.E.2d 821, 338 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1972); Eckhaus v.
Adeck Stores, Inc., 11 N.Y.2d 862, 182 N.E.2d 287, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1962); Battala
v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.2d 34 (1961); Klimas v. Trans Car-
ribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961); Grif-
fiths v. Shaffrey, 308 N.Y. 729, 124 N.E.2d 333 (1954); Kalikoff v. John Lucas & Co.,
Inc., 297 N.Y. 663, 76 N.E.2d 324, affg 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1947);
Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926); Heitz v. Ruppert, 218
N.Y. 148, 112 N.E. 750 (1916); Straws v. Fail, 17 App. Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1962), motion for leave to appeal denied, 12 N.Y.2d 647 (1963); Chernin v. Progress
Serv. Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959), affd on other grounds, 9 N.Y.
2d 880, 175 N.E.2d 827, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1961).
33. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 511, 330 N.E.2d 603,
606, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975). It should be noted that the parties agreed that
the psychological trauma caused claimant's psychological disability. Id. at 509, 330
N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640. Therefore, the controversy over the ability of
medical proof to establish causation, see note 10 supra, was removed.
34. Id. at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
35. Id. Writing for the majority, Judge Wachtler stated:
In a given situation one person may be susceptible to a heart attack while
another may suffer a depressive reaction. In either case the result is the
same-the individual is incapable of functioning properly because of an acci-
dent and should be compensated. ...
Id.
36. Id. See cases cited note 21 supra.
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factor, '3 7 there was no longer any reason for denying recovery when
both trauma and injury were psychological.88
The court rejected respondents' contention that if compensation were
awarded when mental disability resulted from witnessing physical injury
to another, there would be no reasonable way to limit the scope of an
employer's liability.39  Respondents relied upon Tobin v. Grossman,4 0
in which an extension of tort liability for injury to a witness was
refused.41 The Wolfe court pointed out that workmen's compensation
laws reject the traditional tort concept of foreseeability. 42  The court
reasoned that the claimant was intensely involved in the circumstances
surrounding her supervisor's suicide, and concluded that recovery
should be allowed since "the claimant was an active participant in the
tragedy."'43
In dissent, Chief Judge Breitel emphasized the "passive and 'uncon-
nected' status of the claimant to the accident or event which evoked her
symptoms."4  He argued that although it would be proper to award
compensation for psychological disability caused by psychological
trauma to one "who has been the object or subject of an occupational
accident or event," 45 it would expose employers to limitless liability to
37. Id. at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See cases cited note
20 supra.
38. 36 N.Y.2d at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
39. Brief for Respondents at 7-10, Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d
505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975).
40. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
41. Id. In Tobin, the court of appeals denied recovery to a mother whose child
had been struck by defendant's negligently driven automobile. The mother sought to
recover in tort for her own mental and physical injuries which developed after she
witnessed the accident. In denying recovery Chief Judge Breitel emphasized the prob-
lems of limiting liability if recovery were allowed:
The problem of unlimited liability is suggested by the unforeseeable conse-
quence of extending recovery for harm to others than those directly involved
in the accident. If foreseeability be the sole test, then once liability is ex-
tended the logic of the principles would not and could not remain confined.
Id. at 616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
42. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 511, 330 N.E.2d 603,
607, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (1975).
43. Id. See notes 52-56 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 513, 330 N.E.2d at 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 514, 330 N.E.2d at 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 644. Chief Judge Breitel
stated:
Thus, one could agree with the truly vigorous dissent by Judge Dye in Matter
of Chernin v. Progress Ser,. Co .... and yet disagree with the majority in
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award benefits to an individual who merely observes another person's
injury. 4" He warned that, considering the high costs of psychiatric
care, to permit recovery by "mere onlookers" might overburden the
workmen's compensation system.47
The Wolfe opinion is commendable for recognizing the inconsistency
of allowing recovery in cases in which psychological trauma causes
physical disability but denying recovery when a similar trauma causes
psychological disability. 48 The court properly rejected the historical
equation of mental with "unreal" or "imaginary," while correctly recog-
nizing that the developing sophistication of psychiatry has reduced the
difficulty of determining whether a psychological trauma is the cause-in-
fact of a psychological disability.49 The court's acceptance of the view
that psychological disability may constitute an accidental injury"°
freed it to proceed to the key issue of whether the injury was sufficiently
work-related to warrant imposing liability on the employer.51
this case. The claimant in the Chernin case was the actor in and the "cause"
of the unsettling accident. The claimant in this case would be comparable
if somehow her conduct "caused" her superior's suicide.
Id. at 513, 330 N.E.2d at 607-08, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
46. Id. at 514, 330 N.E.2d at 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 644. The dissent reasoned:
The manifold ramifications of possible psychic trauma to the preconditioned
from the impact of events and accidents that occur to other [sic] is unlimited,
and the lines to be drawn between those proximate or remote to the event
or accident are indiscernible on any rational or practical basis.
Id. at 513, 330 N.E.2d at 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 514, 330 N.E.2d at 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
48. Id. See IA L.AsoN § 42.23, at 7-378-79. See also Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis,
103 Ga. App. 749, 751, 120 S.E.2d 655, 656 (1961); Larson, supra note 10, at 1253;
Comment, Mental Stress and Mental Injury in New York Workmen's Compensation,
16 BUFFALO L. REv. 727, 738-39 (1967); 35 NOaE DA ME LAw. 471, 473 (1960).
49. See note 10 supra. See also W. PRossEr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
1 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted):
mhe only valid objection against recovery for mental injury is the danger
of vexatious suits and fictitious claims .... The danger is a real one, and
must be met. Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts which are
plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may well be unwilling to open
the door to an even more dubious field. But the difficulty is not insuperable.
Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by
definite physical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It is
entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence ....
Id. at 212. But see Millar v. Town of Newburgh, 43 App. Div. 2d 641, 349 N.Y.S.2d
218 (1973):
And to those who reply that it is only where medical proof as to such con-
nection that an award will be proper are blind as to how easily some medical
"evidence" seems to be able to be produced in these cases ....
Id. at 642, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
50. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
51. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. Because workmen's compensation
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Unfortunately, rather than providing a critical analysis of the rela-
tionship between claimant's employment and the psychological trauma
that led to her disability, the court offered only the undefined active
participant concept.5 2 Despite Judge Wachtler's statement that "Mrs.
Wolfe was not a third party merely witnessing injury to another," 3 the
court implicitly expanded an employers' liability to include injuries to
some third parties-those who can be considered active participants. 4
It is difficult to predict whether this expansion of liability will be sig-
nificant since the court failed to delineate the circumstances in which
an individual's participation will be viewed as active or passive.c In-
laws are of statutory origin, it is arguable that all limits on recovery should be found
in the language of the statute in question. Having decided that mental disability caused
by psychological trauma may be compensable in some cases, the Wolfe court should have
decided whether Mrs. Wolfe's injury could be viewed as one "arising out of. . . employ-
ment." Unfortunately, the majority did not take this approach. See text accompanying
notes 52-56 infra. -
52. In support of its conclusion that claimant was an "active participant in the
tragedy," the majority opinion provided the following explanation:
[Her supervisor's] nervous condition had intensely involved her, to the point
of her being required to assume his responsibilities and attempting to comfort
him. Not only did she consider his suicide a personal failure but she was
an integral part of the tragedy by virtue of his last communication and her
discovery of his lifeless body. The feeling on her part that she should have
been able to foresee and to prevent the tragedy was undoubtedly a competent
producing cause of her incapacitation.
Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 512, 330 N.E.2d 603, 607, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (1975). These situation-specific facts offer little in the way of a
general standard to guide courts in applying the active participant requirement.
53. Id. at 511, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642 (emphasis added).
54. Commenting on Wolfe, one writer has argued that the court avoided the third-
party question "by holding that as a matter of fact the claimant was not a 'third party,'
but was an 'active participant.' 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 204, 212 n.67 (1975) (emphasis
original). The problem with this reading of the case is that the majority opinion never
stated whether the active participant language should be read as a finding of fact or
conclusion of law. Indeed, the majority opinion provides little or no guidance for inter-
preting and applying the active participant concept. See note 52 supra and accom-
panying text. Given this deficiency, it is difficult to disagree with Chief Judge Breitel's
view that Mrs. Wolfe was a third party. See 36 N.Y. at 512-14, 330 N,E.2d at 607-
08, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
55. It is difficult to ascertain how the Wolfe court would deal with slightly varied
fact situations. Presumably, a janitor who developed a psychological disability after dis-
covering the body of an employee he did not know would be denied recovery. This con-
clusion follows from the heavy emphasis of the Wolfe court on the close relationship
between Mrs. Wolfe and her supervisor. But would the court have considered her an
active participant if she had not been so emotionally involved with her supervisor?
Would the court have allowed Mrs. Wolfe to recover if she had been home when in-
formed of the suicide? Had the suicide occurred in full view of a large number ,of co-
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stead, the court announced a case-by-case approach to the question
whether a given claimant is an active participant.56
Another weakness in both the majority and dissenting opinions was
their failure to discuss the effects an award of workmen's compensation
benefits might have upon a claimant afflicted with a psychological dis-
ability. Several commentators have suggested that awarding compensa-
tion in such circumstances may adversely affect rehabilitation. 57  If
employees, and several had developed psychological disabilities, would compensation
have been allowed?
Other workmen's compensation cases have not dealt with this limitation of liability
question. Several torts cases, however, have considered the problem. These tort cases
have involved the issue of permitting a parent, who witnesses his child's being struck
by a negligently driven automobile, to recover for his own mental and physical injuries.
In general, courts have denied recovery in such cases, on the theory that "the defendant
could not reasonably anticipate any harm to the plaintiff, and therefore owes her no duty
of care." PROssER, supra note 49, at 333. Some courts, however, have held to the con-
trary. In Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), the
court reasoned that since duty "is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty
or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case basis." Id. at
740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court proceeded to list three factors
to be considered in determining whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff
from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as con-
trasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with
an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Discussing these factors, Professor
Prosser stated:
Admittedly such restrictions are quite arbitrary, have no reason in themselves,
and would be imposed only in order to draw a line somewhere short of undue
liability; but they may be necessary in order not to "leave the liability of a
negligent defendant open to undue extension by the verdict of sympatheticjuries who under our system must define and apply any general rule to the
facts of the case before them."
PRossER, supra note 49, at 335, quoting Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HLv. L. REv.
725, 735 (1937). Perhaps the Wolfe court meant to embody such factors within the
"active participant" language. See note 52 supra. But given the objectives of workmen's
compensation laws, see note 6 supra and accompanying text, and the absence of juries
in workmen's compensation cases, the justification for imposing such arbitrary restric-
tions would seem inapplicable to workmen's compensation cases. See note 51 supra.
56. The majority opinion states, "This is not to say that liability should be extended
indefinitely, we must consider the record before us in light of the commonsense view-
point of the average man .... ." Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505,
511, 330 N.E.2d 603, 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642 (1975) (citation omitted). See also
40 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 204, 213 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 12. Hanna argued that awarding compensation
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these commentators are correct, the Wolfe decision ironically appears
to harm those persons that it intended to assist.58
Despite its shortcomings, the Wolfe decision is likely to be favorably
received. 59 The case reflects a more realistic view of the character and
causes of psychological disability than prior New York cases. It re-
mains to be seen whether subsequent decisions will fashion the active
participant language into a functional concept for limiting the scope of
employers' liability or discard the concept altogether.
to a claimant suffering from a psychological disability serves only to "foster" the disabil-
ity:
Whatever the recovery, in most cases there has been no real benefit to any-
one. The employer has been forced to compensate a highly-questionable
claim. The employee, if a malingerer, or gross exaggerator, has experienced
success in the perpetration of a fraud. If he is merely fooling himself . . .
the award nevertheless confers upon him a certificate of disability which will
confirm in his mind the fact that he is disqualified, largely or altogether,
from having in future [sic] to provide the earnings which formerly he supplied
for his family.
Id. at 202. See also Comment, supra note 6, at 1147-50 & nn.130-42.
58. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
59. Professor Larson, for example, commenting on the Chernin and Strawvs deci-
sions, see text accompanying notes 22-28 supra, criticized New York's failure to take
a "simple step into the twentieth century." IA LAmSON § 42.23, at 7-379.
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